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Abstract:* 
The purpose of this paper is twofold: First, it derives the optimal LTV-ratio for a mortgagor 
that maximizes the return to home equity when considering the capital structure of housing 
investment. Second, it analyses the demand side contribution to mortgage market variability 
across monetary policy regimes. The paper endogenises both the relation between the loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio and the mortgage rate and the relation between LTV and the rate of 
appreciation. When analyzing LTV-variance and the demand side contribution to mortgage 
market variability we consider three stylized regimes. The paper finds an intuitive ranking of 
LTV-ratios across regimes, where the optimal LTV-ratio peaks during a housing boom. The 
demand side contribution to market variability is however at its highest during “normal” 
market conditions in housing and mortgage markets when monetary policy ignores asset 
inflation. Hence, there is a potentially humped shaped relation between the risk exposure of 
individual mortgagors and the demand side contribution to mortgage market variability.  
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1. Introduction 
Empirical evidence shows variations in the Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio across both markets 
and periods (see for instance Calza et al (2013) or Amior and Halket (2014)). Focusing the 
supply side of mortgage markets, a higher LTV-ratio is related to financial developments 
allowing for improved sorting- and pricing of credit risk (Duca et al, 2010). Others, analyzing 
profit-maximizing mortgagee behavior, find LTV-variations from differences in risk pricing, 
moral hazard, external funding, lending and collateral effects, producing context specific 
LTV-ratios (Borgersen, 2015).  
The supply side is obviously important for both LTV-variations and mortgage market 
developments in general (see for instance Warnock and Warnock (2008 or Leece (2014))). 
But a fundamental question remains. What is the demand side contribution to variations in the 
LTV-ratio?  
A number of factors impact the demand for LTV. Factors important for mortgage demand, 
such as demographics, household income, savings and risk aversion, are also important for 
LTV-ratios. In fact, owner-occupied housing serves a multiple of purposes providing housing 
consumption benefits, serving as an investment object and being used as collateral for 
mortgages (Sommervoll et al, 2010). The demand side contribution to variations in the LTV-
ratio is thus easily argued as context-specific.  
The majority of papers focusing the demand for LTV highlight contributions from the 
consumption motive (see for instance Berger et al (2011) or Agarwal et al (2014). This paper 
highlights the contribution to variations in the LTV-ratio arising from the investment motive 
of housing demand. Often related to speculation and housing bubbles, the impact of the 
investment motive to the optimal LTV-ratio is also of interest when assessing policies to 
ensure financial stability.   
Borgersen and Greibrokk (2012) separate the return to home equity (RHE) between a price 
gain and a leverage gain when considering the funding structure of housing investments. 
While standard when addressing real estate, the funding approach is not so common when 
analyzing housing. When the rate of appreciation exceeds the mortgage rate there is, 
compared to equity finance, an additional RHE for mortgage financed housing. The incentive 
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to increase leverage that the excess return to housing and the leverage gain creates is at the 
core of the reasoning that follows.   
Analyzing different regimes in both mortgage- and in the housing markets the paper first 
considers the optimal LTV-ratio for a household that maximizes RHE. This paper 
endogenises the relations between the LTV-ratio and the factors that determine the excess 
return to housing, the mortgage rate and the rate of housing appreciation, respectively. The 
optimal LTV-ratio peaks in a housing boom, when the positive price effect of a higher LTV-
ratio dominates. A housing bust, where the negative relation between the mortgage rate and 
the LTV-ratio dominates, produces the lowest LTV-ratio. When housing and mortgage 
markets are characterized by normal market conditions the optimal LTV-ratio is in between 
these two. 
The paper continues by addressing the contribution to mortgage market variability from the 
investment motive in housing demand, framing it in a discussion of macro-prudential policy 
and whether a central bank should lean against the wind. Here more novel results emerge. 
Seeing the demand for LTV as an indicator of mortgage demand, variations in the LTV-ratio 
represent the demand side contribution to mortgage market variability.   
While the optimal LTV-ratio peaks in a housing boom, is the demand side contribution to 
mortgage market variability shown to be contingent on how the central bank targets asset 
inflation. When the central bank ignores asset inflation mortgage market variability peaks 
when conditions in housing and mortgage markets are “normal”, and both mortgage rates and 
house prices are affected by LTV-ratios. Thus, the paper argues for a potentially a humped-
shaped relation between the optimal LTV-ratio for a mortgagor maximizing RHE and 
mortgage market variability. The demand side contribution to mortgage market variability is 
of particular interest in relation to macro-prudential policy in general, and LTV-caps more 
specifically (Claessens et al (2013). Some argue LTV-caps as efficient tools to constrain 
mortgage supply and support banking stability, but leaving the demand side of mortgage 
markets rather unaffected (Wong et al, 2014). Others focus on whether monetary policy and 
macro-prudential policy are supplementary or complementary measures for ensuring financial 
stability (see for instance IMF (2013)). This paper is relevant to both discussions.   
The paper is structured as follows: The next section relates our approach to the literature on 
optimal LTV-ratios. The third section illustrates rather conventionally both the leverage gain 
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and the risk associated with different funding structures for housing investments. The fourth 
section endogenizes both the relation between the LTV-ratio and the mortgage rate and the 
relation between house prices and the LTV-ratio. The fifth section derives the optimal LTV-
ratio across three different regimes. The sixth section analyses mortgage market variability. 
The last section concludes. 
2. Relations to the LTV-literature 
When focusing the supply side of the mortgage market Duca et al (2010) relates higher LTV-
ratios to two types of financial innovations, credit scoring technology and the pricing of non-
prime mortgages. Borgersen (2015) relates the optimal LTV-ratio for a profit maximizing 
mortgagee to moral hazard, risk pricing, funding, lending volumes and collateral values. 
Goodhart and Hoffman (2008) see higher LTV-ratios as a response to nominal return targets 
in a low interest rate environment. Borgersen and Robertsen (2012) show how weak 
regulations might allow for higher LTV-ratios during appreciations as higher collateral values 
reduce loss given default.  
Instead of highlighting supply side factors, both Aherne et al (2005) and Campbell and 
Hercowitz (2006) see variations in the LTV-ratio as a result of changes in the regulatory and 
legal framework, treating the LTV-ratio as an exogenous variable. Taking mortgage supply 
and mortgage demand into account, Allen and Carletti (2011) and Lin (2014) endogenises the 
LTV-ratio. Lin (2014) applies a (monetary) general equilibrium model to show how the 
welfare of the debtor is not monotonically increasing in the LTV-ratio and that the optimal 
LTV-ratio both for the debtor and the creditor allows for the possibility of ex post default. 
Separating between two regimes, Allen and Carletti (2011) show how a reduction in the 
interest rate might be unstable if the LTV-ratio is too high and how macro-prudential policies, 
such as an LTV-cap, will reduce house price growth when markets are booming.   
When abstracting away from the supply side and highlighting the demand side of mortgage 
markets the LTV-ratio can be argued to vary between young adults and the elderly, due to 
differences in savings and income (See for instance Attanasio et al (2012), Fischer and 
Gervais (2011) or Iacoviello and pavan (2013). However, modelling mortgage demand is 
complex due to that demand is derived from a mix between the motives for housing 
consumption and housing investments (Bruckner, 1997). Models often lack closed form 
solutions (Alm and Follain, 1987). Standard references for mortgage demand models are 
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Brueckner (1994), Dunsky and Follain (1997, 2000), and Alm and Follain (1987). The degree 
of risk aversion will obviously matter for the optimal LTV-ratio, and Amior and Halket 
(2014) for instance argue for negative correlation between house price volatility and the LTV-
ratio.  
Most of the analysis on housing demand highlights the consumption motives. Poterba (1984) 
introduced housing as an asset, and the investment motive, when analyzing housing demand. 
Guiso et al (2002) as well as Campbell and Cocco (2003) discuss different aspects of 
household portfolios, highlighting the role of risk aversion. Brueckner (1997) extended 
Henderson and Ioannides (1983) analyzing the interaction between consumption and 
investment motives in household portfolios. The paper shows how portfolios often are 
inefficient in a mean-variance sense, when housing is included. Highlighting the investment 
aspect of housing Borgersen and Greibrokk (2012) analysed the demand for LTV focusing on 
the optimal funding structure. The funding structure approach is commonly used when 
analyzing commercial real estate investments (see for instance Harris and Raviv (1991)), but 
not when addressing housing. A number of papers analyses different aspects of optimal 
funding structures, such as the tax policy on interest and dividends, stock prices and interest 
rates, the level of business activity, risk attitude, optimal operational control and future 
flexibility (see for instance Groth et al (1997), Flannery  et al (2006) or Delcoure (2007) for 
different aspects of optimal capital structure). An optimal capital structure minimizes the cost 
of capital and, hence, maximizes the return, or firm value, is analogue to a household 
maximizing RHE. 
3. The capital structure of housing investments 
We start by repeating the approach of Borgersen and Greibrokk (2012) where a dwelling V is 
financed by equity E and a mortgage D . House price growth p gives the total (expected) 
return to housing investments which must compensate creditors and provide a return to home 
equity (RHE) e, where the mortgage rate r  determines the former. Applying the loan-to-value 
(LTV) 
V
D
 and equity-ratio
V
E
 gives the standard investment theory-relation before taxes as  
1)                                                 r
V
D
V
E
ep 
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By rearranging, this is expressed as    
  
2)
                                                 
),( rp
E
D
pe 
 
Expression 2) shows how RHE is divided between a price gain p and a leverage gain
)( Brp
E
D
 . The leverage gain is positively related to the mortgage-to-equity ratio (D/E) and 
the difference between the rate of appreciation and the mortgage rate - hereafter referred to as 
the excess return to mortgage financed housing.  
A numerical example illustrates both the incentive for increasing leverage in the presence of 
excess return to housing, as well as the risk increase associated with higher leverage. Let us 
consider two situations where the rate of appreciation is fixed at 8 percent, but where the 
mortgage rate is either 4 or 10 percent respectively. We consider three different funding 
structures, one where the LTV-ratio is 80 percent and another where the LTV-ratio is 90 
percent and, finally, a case with 100 percent equity financing. When housing is 100 percent 
equity financed (D=0 in expression 2) RHE is always equal to the rate of appreciation. For the 
two other funding structures RHE is:    
 4%r and  %8 p  10%r and  %8 p  
80LTVe  24% 0% 
90LTVe  40% -10% 
When the rate of appreciation exceeds the mortgage rate there are incentives to increase 
leverage as 8090   LTVLTV ee . When the mortgage rate exceeds the rate of appreciation there 
are no incentives to increase leverage as
8090   LTVLTV ee .  
Figure 1 pictures the range of variation in RHE for the two situations described above across 
the three funding structures. The variation in RHE can here be seen as an indicator of the risk 
exposure the different funding structures entail. A housing investment completely funded by 
equity produces a RHE equal to the rate of appreciation, which we have fixed at 8 percent 
abstracting away from price risk. Figure 1 also shows a positive relation between leverage and 
the range of variation in RHE. When LTV is 80 percent the RHE varies from 0 percent to 20 
percent, while RHE varies between -10 percent and 40 percent when LTV is 90 percent.  
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>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Figure 1 about here >>>>>>>>>>>>> 
Expression 2) shows both the incentives to increase the LTV-ratio when there is excess return 
to mortgage financed housing, and the increased risk exposure that accompany a higher LTV-
ratio. We rewrite expression 2) by inserting the definitions of the LTV-ratio 
V
D
 and the 
equity-ratio  1
V
E
 and utilizing the fact that the sum of the LTV-ratio and the equity-ratio 
is 1, as   
2’)                                                    ).(
1
rppe 




 
With the aim of maximizing RHE the optimal LTV-ratio is found by considering 0
d
de
, 
which condition is simply rp  .1 With the aim of maximizing the RHE the first-order 
condition for the optimal LTV-ratio is characterized by equality between the rate of 
appreciation and the mortgage rate.  
4. Endogenizing mortgage demand and the price effect of higher LTV-ratios    
The relation between housing appreciation and the cost of borrowing is crucial for the excess 
return to mortgage financed housing. Both these two variables can be related to the LTV-
ratio. To extend the reasoning on the optimal LTV-ratio for a household that maximizes RHE 
this section endognises the components of the excess return to housing.  
First we introduce a negative relation between mortgage demand and the mortgage rate
0)(r  where)( ' r . Mortgage demand is expressed in terms of the LTV-ratio. The negative 
relation between the mortgage rate and the LTV-ratio produces a conventional downward 
sloping demand curve. In addition to conventional demand side arguments a higher LTV-ratio 
is also reducing the equity stake a mortgagor has in a house, increasing moral hazard and the 
probability of mortgage default (see for instance Holmstrøm and Tirole (1997) or Demirguc-
                                                          
1 The condition for 0
d
de
 is found by considering the derivative
 











 1
1
)1(
rp
d
de
. We see how 
the first-order condition is characterized by equality across the mortgage rate and the rate of appreciation. 
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Kunt and Detragiache (2002)), raising the cost of borrowing, supporting the negative relation 
between the mortgage rate and the LTV-ratio.  
We also allow for a positive relation between the rate of appreciation and the LTV-ratio
0)(p    where)( ' p . The argument is related to the endogenous credit constraint of 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), where the LTV-ratio is a proxy for mortgage volume. The price 
effect from a higher LTV-ratio is driven by how increased mortgage volumes stimulate house 
prices.2 The effect we pursue when deriving the optimal LTV-ratio is the accompanying effect 
on LTV-ratio from higher collateral values. This bidirectional causality between house prices 
and mortgage volumes is for instance shown by Anundsen and Jansen (2013), Adelino et al 
(2012), Pavlov and Wachter (2011) and Sophocles and Vlassoppulos (2009).   
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Figure 2 about here>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
The two relations are presented in Figure 2, where the LTV-ratio is positioned both according 
to the mortgage rate and the rate of appreciation.3 The north-east quadrant gives the 
downward sloping demand for LTV (the demand effect), while the north-west quadrant gives 
the positive relation between the LTV-ratio and the rate of appreciation (the price effect). 
From Figure 2 we see the effect of a mortgage rate hike from A to B, where the lower LTV-
ratio also reduces the rate of appreciation. Figure 2 illustrates a negative correlation between 
house prices and mortgage rates to be discussed later when introducing monetary policy.  
5. The optimal LTV-ratio  
The optimal LTV-ratio is (again) found by considering 0
d
de
. Taking the derivative of 
expression 2’) with respect to the LTV-ratio, and inserting for the two relations argued above, 
we find  
3)                                  
 
    


 



11
1
)( ''
2
' rprpp
d
de
. 
                                                          
2 In our demand side model, we assume whatever mortgage demand there is to be supplied by mortgagees. For 
the relation between mortgage supply and the LTV-ratio see for instance Borgersen (2015). 
3 We assume a convex relation for the demand function 0)(
'' r  and for the price effect we allow for stronger 
financial accelerators the higher the LTV-ratio .0)(
'' p  
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We consider three stylized regimes characterized by the different relations between housing 
and mortgage markets sketched by Borgersen (2016). In a housing boom appreciations might 
be due to both market fundamentals and the prevailing mortgage policy. The latter argument 
introduces, as argued by Pavlow and Wachter (2011) a positive relation between house prices 
and the LTV-ratio. Highlighting mortgage markets we, as in the financial accelerator regime 
of Borgersen (2016) assume appreciations during a boom to be dominated by the positive 
relation between house prices and the LTV-ratio. A housing bust on the other hand, is 
characterized by negative market sentiment and housing depreciations. The lending policy of 
mortgagees is now more restrictive and it is the repayment ability of mortgagors, which in the 
terminology of Borgersen (2016) is the first-line of defense in the credit-risk assessments of a 
mortgagee that governs mortgage policy. This puts the relation between house prices and the 
LTV-ratio out of play, while the negative relation between the mortgage rate and the LTV-
ratio as given by the mortgage demand function dominates this regime. Finally, we refer to 
the regime where both the negative demand effect and the positive price effect are included a 
“normal housing-mortgage market relation”.  
Regime I: A housing boom 
Let us start by considering a housing boom where we abstract away from risk pricing and 
assume 0)(
'
r . This reduces expression 3) to  
4)                           
 
 


 



11
1
)( '
2
' prpp
d
de
. 
The optimal LTV-ratio can, after rearranging, be expressed as  
 5)                           
 
   
.
)(
1
)(
''
'






p
rp
p
rppI  
As 0)(
'
p  by assumption, we have 1I  when rp  , 1I when rp   and 1I  
when rp  . In a booming housing market the optimal LTV-ratio is below 100 percent only 
when the excess return to mortgage financed housing is negative.4 When the excess return to 
                                                          
4 The condition for 0I is ).()( ' prp  We assume this inequality to hold. As 0)(' p  we see that I  
is positive, even for small negative values on the excess return to housing.  
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mortgage financed housing is positive rp  , and we allow for the positive impact from 
higher LTV-ratios to house prices, the optimal LTV-ratio is above 100 percent.    
Regime II: A housing bust 
In a housing bust house prices are driven by market fundamentals and not mortgage policy, 
and we abstract away from the price effect by assuming .0)(' p The negative demand 
effect and the relation between the mortgage rate and the LTV-ratio is now included, reducing 
expression 3) to  
6)                                 
 
 


 



11
1
)( '
2
rrp
d
de
.  
Rearranging the condition for 0
d
de
gives   
7)                                    0)('2'  rprr   
The optimal LTV-ratio is now independent of all model variables and equal to  
8)                                         .
2
1
II  
When we compare Regime I and Regime II we have III    as long as  
2
)(
'  prp  . 
Even for some negative values on the excess return to housing the investment motive lifts the 
optimal LTV-ratio in a boom above the optimal LTV-ratio during a bust.  
Regime III: A normal housing-mortgage market relation 
Finally, considering more normal market conditions where both the negative demand effect 
and the positive price effect of higher LTV-ratios are taken into account the derivative is as 
given by expression 3) and the first-order condition equals  
9)                                  0)()(0 '''2'  prprpr
d
de


. 
Solving for the optimal LTV-ratio gives  
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10)                               
   
 
 
 





'
'
'
''
22
1
2 r
p
r
prIII   
As 0)(
'
r the condition for 0III is 
 
 '
'
1
r
p 
  or alternatively,     '' pr , which we 
assume is the case. A positive LTV-ratio is contingent on the positive house price effect 
exceeding the negative demand effect.   
Comparing the optimal LTV-ratio across the three regimes we see directly how IIIII    as 
long as 0)(
'
p , which holds by assumption. When comparing a housing bust to a situation 
with normal market conditions, the optimal LTV-ratio is higher in the latter regime. This is 
intuitive as this regime also incorporates the positive price effect, while the housing bust only 
takes the negative demand side effect of a higher LTV-ratio into account.  
When comparing a housing boom to the normal market situation we find IIII   when
 
)(2
)(
2
)(
'
2''





r
pp
rp . When this condition holds the optimal LTV-ratio during a housing 
boom is higher than the LTV-ratio optimal during normal market conditions.5  
If we compare the three optimal LTV-ratios we find the intuitive ranking IIIIII   . The 
optimal LTV-ratio is lowest during a housing bust, where the mortgage rate responds to 
higher LTV-ratios but house prices do not. In this regime a higher LTV-ratio impacts 
negatively on the excess return to mortgage financed housing, pulling the optimal LTV-ratio 
towards lower levels. During a housing boom, where only the positive price effect is included 
and a higher LTV-ratio impact positively on the excess return, the optimal LTV-ratio peaks.  
When both the negative demand effect and the positive price effect is included the total 
impact on the excess return is a combination of the two, and the optimal LTV-ratio is in 
between.  
6. LTV-variation, leaning against the wind and mortgage market variability 
                                                          
5 As both components on the left hand side of the inequality are negative, this intuitive result is valid for some 
negative values on the excess return to housing. 
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In this section we consider the demand side contribution to mortgage market variability.  
When applying the optimal LTV-ratio as an indicator for mortgage demand variations in the 
LTV-ratio represent the demand side contribution to mortgage market variability.   
Obviously, in Regime II, where II is a fixed number 0)( IIVar  .  
Moving on to consider a housing boom (Regime I), we find the variance of I as 
11)            
     


















'''  
r)(p,var  2-)r(  )p( 
1)(
pVar
KoVarVar
p
rp
Var
p
rp
VarVar I . 
The negative relation between the mortgage rate and the rate of appreciation (see Figure 2), 
makes Kovar (p, r) <0. From expression 11) we have 0)( IVar  . 
When market conditions are normal and both the price effect and the demand side effect are 
included, we find the variance of III as  
12)                  
   
   










'
''''
'
''
r 4
)r,(pvar 2)(p  )(r 
2
)(
Var
KoVarVar
r
pr
VarVar III . 
The assumed shape of the two curves in Figure 2 equates the sign on the covariance between 
the mortgage rate and the rate appreciation to the sign on the covariance between the two 
first-derivatives Kovar (p’,r’) <0. While )( IVar  is unambiguously positive, we have to 
assume     ),var(2 '''' rpKopVarrVar  for the same to be true for )( IIIVar  . 
When we compare the variance of I and III we find two scenarios: One where the higher 
LTV-ratio derived from a  housing boom also carries with it higher mortgage market 
variability in terms of  )()( IIII VarVar   , The other scenario is one where 
)()( IIII VarVar   . Focusing on the latter where the higher LTV-ratio I derived from a 
housing boom contributes less to mortgage market variability than the lower LTV-ratio III
derived from a situation with normal market conditions, this scenario comes about as  
13)                                                          .  
where                 )(),var(2)(),var(8 '''' pVarrpKorVarrpKo                 
13 
 
                                )()(4)( '''' rVarpVarrVarrVarrVarpVar  . 
(The condition for )()( IIII VarVar    is  ).  
The parameter   captures the empirical elements of the two endogenous relations while   is 
an indicator of the co-movement between the housing and the mortgage market.6 This co-
movement includes both the covariance between the mortgage rate and the rate of 
appreciation Kovar (p,r) as well as the covariance between the marginal effects of a higher 
LTV-ratio on the mortgage rate and the rate of appreciation respectively Kovar(p’,r’). Figure 
2 describes the negative covariance between the mortgage rate and house prices. Even so, the 
slopes of the two endogenous relations ensure a negative covariance between the first-
derivatives.7   
The co-movement between housing and mortgage markets is an indicator of how monetary 
policy responds to asset inflation. A low co-variance between housing and mortgage markets 
might be due to a failing rental equivalence strategy (See for instance Diewert (2001) or 
Borgersen and Sommervoll, (2012)), or - as we pursue in the following - a central bank that 
ignores asset prices and only target gaps in output and inflation (see Borio and Lowe (2002) 
or IMF (2009) for monetary policy strategies and asset inflation).  
When monetary policy does not respond to asset inflation the co-movement between the 
housing and the mortgage market is weak. When the co-movement is below a certain 
threshold (as given by 13) mortgage market variability is higher during normal market 
conditions than during booms, even though the LTV-ratio is higher in the latter. A central 
bank that does not target asset inflation creates excess market variability, as in the case of the 
marginal crisis risk of Woodford (2012).  
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Figure 3 about here >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
                                                          
6 We assume 0 while is unambiguously positive.  
7 A negative covariance between the first-derivatives makes a higher mortgage rate go together with lower house 
price growth across all mortgage rates. How powerful the components described by Figure 2 are, differ however 
across mortgage rates. Consider a case where a higher LTV-ratio lifts the mortgage rate through standard risk 
pricing. When the mortgage rate initially is high, a 1 percent change in LTV will have a large effect on the 
mortgage rate but a small effect on the rate of appreciation. The price effect is small due to that the financial 
accelerator is stronger the higher the LTV-ratio. When the LTV-ratio is low, the financial accelerator is 
accordingly weak and the price effect is therefore small. When the mortgage rate is low a 1 percent change in the 
LTV-ratio has however, due to the convex slope on the demand curve, a large effect on the mortgage rate. As the 
accelerator is stronger, so is the price effect. The convex assumption on mortgage demand is for illustrative 
purposes and is not crucial for the argument. The two regimes that are discussed in the following will also come 
about in the case of a concave demand function.   
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Figure 3 pictures the relation between the optimal LTV-ratio and mortgage market variability, 
and, when considering normal market conditions, the effect of two different monetary policy 
regimes. One regime where monetary policy targets asset inflation (represented by  ), 
and a regime where asset prices are ignored ( ).   
The model produces an intuitive ranking of LTV-ratios across three stylized regimes. The 
optimal LTV-ratio bottoms out in a housing bust where the LTV-ratio impacts the excess 
return negatively through the mortgage rate and peaks in a housing boom where the LTV-
ratio impacts the excess return positively through a capital gain. In a more normal situation 
where mortgage markets are characterized by a downward sloping demand curve and housing 
markets see positive feed-back effects on prices from the optimal LTV-ratio is somewhere in 
between.  However, while the optimal LTV-ratio is between that of a bust and that of a boom 
respectively, is the strength of the mortgage market variability during normal market 
conditions contingent on how monetary policy responds to asset inflation. When monetary 
policy ignores asset inflation it allows the demand side contribution to mortgage market 
variability to exceed that of a housing boom. A monetary policy that, on the other hand, takes 
asset inflation into account  will counteract the effect of a higher LTV-ratio on the rate of 
appreciation by simultaneously lifting the mortgage rate, thereby reduce the demand side 
contribution to market variability compared to in a the housing boom. There is thus a 
potentially humped shaped relation between the optimal LTV-ratio and the individual risk 
exposure of a mortgagor and mortgage market variability across our three regimes.   
Figure 3 provides several lessons for monetary policy and financial stability. The first is that 
macro-prudential policy and monetary policy are complements and not substitutes in the 
battle to ensure financial stability. A cap on the LTV-ratio is by itself not sufficient to 
constrain mortgage market variability. The cap should be accompanied by a monetary policy 
targeting asset inflation. Second, when asset inflation is not a target for monetary policy a cap 
on the LTV-ratio might not be sufficient for reducing the demand side contribution to 
mortgage market variability as the excess return to mortgage financed housing still stimulates 
the investment motive in housing demand. Third, and again related to the two former, a pro-
cyclic macro-prudential policy should be aware of the mortgage market variability that 
develops in the period preceding a housing boom (See Gelati and Moessner (2011) for macro 
prudential policy in general). When monetary policy ignores asset inflation it allows for 
speculative behavior which might create bubbles and instability later on.       
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7. Summary and discussion 
A rate of appreciation that exceeds the mortgage rate introduces a leverage gain to mortgage 
financed housing. This provides incentives to increase leverage for households entering 
owner-occupation. The incentives might be particularly strong when the investment motive is 
important for housing demand. Conventionally, higher leverage increases the risk exposure of 
homeowners. While standard when analyzing commercial investments the arguments 
regarding leverage are less common when analyzing housing investments.   
Owner-occupied housing serves a multiple of purposes, including as a source for housing 
consumption and as an object for investments. For a household entering owner-occupied 
housing in need of mortgage finance the optimal LTV-ratio is therefore related to a number of 
factors. Thinking in terms of housing consumption, the level of savings and household income 
are important, often separating the optimal LTV-ratio for young adults from the optimal LTV-
ratio of households with a history of savings and built-up equity.    
Highlighting the investment motive of owner-occupied housing this paper derives the optimal 
LTV-ratio for a household maximizing RHE. Relating the investment motive of housing 
demand to speculative behavior and housing bubbles (see for instance Malpezzi and Wachter 
(2005)), this reasoning should be equally important as consumption motives when considering 
demand side contributions to variations in the LTV-ratio. Being at the heart of housing 
bubbles and financial instability, the arguments is also relevant for monetary policy strategies 
and macro-prudential policy.  
When considering the capital structure of housing investments we derive the optimal LTV-
ratio for a household maximizing RHE across three stylized regimes. In a housing boom, 
where the positive effect on house prices from higher LTV-ratios dominates, the optimal 
LTV-ratio peaks. The optimal LTV-ratio bottoms out in a housing bust where the negative 
relation between the LTV-ratio and the mortgage rate dominates. When market conditions are 
normal, and both the negative demand effect and the positive price effect of higher LTV-
ratios are taken into account, the optimal LTV-ratio is somewhere in between. As the excess 
return to housing determines the incentives to increase leverage, a ranking of LTV-ratios 
where the regime that includes the positive (negative) effect of higher LTV-ratios on the 
excess return provides the peak (the bottom) is intuitive.     
16 
 
This intuitive ranking of optimal LTV-ratios across regimes implies however a potentially 
less intuitive ranking when it comes to the demand side contribution to mortgage market 
variability.   
Mortgage market variability is assessed considering variations in the LTV-ratio, our indicator 
for mortgage demand. In a housing bust the demand side of mortgage markets does not 
contribute to mortgage market variability when the investment motive dominates housing 
demand. Despite that the optimal LTV-ratio peaks in housing boom, is the demand side 
contribution to mortgage market variability at its highest during normal conditions in housing 
and mortgage markets when monetary policy does not respond to asset inflation. Thus, the 
paper finds a potentially humped-shaped relation between the LTV-ratio and the demand side 
contribution to mortgage market variability.   
While the optimal LTV-ratio and, hence, the individual risk taking in mortgage markets is at 
its highest when we abstract away from the negative relation between the LTV-ratio and the 
mortgage rate, the demand side contribution to mortgage market variability is contingent on 
how monetary policy responds to asset inflation. When monetary policy takes asset inflation 
into account is there, as shown by Figure 3, a positive relation between the LTV-ratio and 
mortgage market variability. When, on the other hand, monetary policy does not consider 
asset inflation the LTV-variation and the demand side contribution to mortgage market 
variability, peaks as housing and mortgage markets are characterized by normal market 
conditions.  
The link between the investment motive of housing demand, speculative behavior and 
housing bubbles provides a context for policy considerations when thinking in terms of 
financial stability. The first comment in this regard is that macro-prudential policy such as 
LTV-caps is not an alternative to leaning against the wind. Macro-prudential and monetary 
policy are, as seen by Figure 3, complementary in effort to ensure financial stability. An LTV 
cap, for instance set as IIICAP   will allow mortgage demand to produce the highest level of 
market variability when the cap is not accompanied by a monetary policy leaning against the 
wind. A combination of a macro-prudential policy intervention such as an LTV-cap and a 
monetary policy targeting asset inflation is reducing the demand side contribution to mortgage 
market variability. 
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